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Intra-party conf licts of all shapes and complexions have been part and 
parcel of Nigeria’s democratic journey. However, in recent times, they have 
become much more pervasive and even assumed crisis dimensions, with 
negative implications for democratic stability and consolidation. Drawing 
from the literature and interpreting the evidence, this article examines the 
terrain, implications and drivers of intra-party conf licts in a democratising 
Nigeria with a view to recommending options for resolution. It proceeds 
from the premise that pervasive intra-party conf licts, which have now 
assumed crisis dimensions, are not given, but have been nurtured by 
certain structural factors which have shaped the contours of politics in 
Nigeria. Specifically, it argues that the crises are closely connected with the 
neo-patrimonial character of the Nigerian petro state, the nature of politics 
being played by the political actors, praetorian hangover, and the paucity of 
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democrats who genuinely have democratic temperaments to play the game 
of  democratic politics according to established rules. It calls for, among 
others, the reform and strengthening of the internal conf lict management 
capacities of political parties in Nigeria.
Keywords: democracy, political parties, elections, intra-party conflicts, 
conflict management, Nigeria
Introduction
As political organisations, made up of individuals with divergent opinions, 
values, interests, and also as platforms for recruiting personnel to occupy 
public offices, political parties cannot but be an arena of conflict arising 
from mutually exclusive views, thoughts and interests. Indeed, beyond 
being conveniently tagged, albeit theoretically, as the media for aggregating 
interests and opinions within a polity (Omotola 2010:125), political parties’ 
personalities in liberal democracy are constantly shaped and reshaped by 
ever-recurring conflicts among the different actors within their folds. 
Put differently, conflict, in different shapes and dimensions, is part and parcel 
of the operational architectures of political parties in a liberal democracy. 
While intra-party conf lict the world over may emanate in different 
forms and sizes, the most debilitating, not only to democracy itself but 
to the society as a whole, are those arising over the selection of party 
leadership and candidates. Ideally, political parties are expected to 
put in place adequate institutional frameworks for mediating conf licts 
that may occasionally arise among their members (see Scarrow 2005). 
By institutionalising such frameworks, they do not only engender consensus 
building within their folds, but also contribute overtly to the stability of 
the entire system (Simbine 2015:5). In the words of Omotola (2010:12), 
‘if well-institutionalized, political parties can serve as a set of mediating 
institutions through which differences in ideas, interests, and perceptions 
of political problems at a given time can be managed’. 
The foregoing ideal would appear to have been internalised and 
institutionalised in mature liberal democracies, where institutions 
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for regulating power contestations within political parties have 
been entrenched. But in a democratising Nigeria, as in most illiberal 
democracies, the opposite seems to be applicable (Basiru 2015:83). Since 
the country re-democratised itself in 1999, it may not be out of place 
to assert that political parties’ records in the area of internal conf lict 
management have not been disappointing (see Olaniyan 2009; Ojukwu 
and Olaifa 2011), but in the last few years, the lack of conf lict management 
has resulted in unending intra-party wrangling, ceaseless litigations, 
wanton party defections, among other antimonies that are rare in liberal 
climes (see Omilusi 2013; Nwanegbo et al. 2014). Although the problem 
is not new, but has been manifested during the country’s previous 
Republics, the dimension of the problem in the Fourth Republic is indeed 
alarming. This is evident from the acrimonies and crises that trailed the 
recently concluded primaries of major political parties across the country 
(Daka and Abuh 2018:1). 
Against the backdrop of the foregoing and considering the crisis dimension 
that intra-party conf licts have assumed in recent times, it is thus imperative 
to interrogate the pervasiveness of intra-party conf licts in a democratising 
Nigeria. Although there has been a plethora of works on internal democracy 
within political parties in a democratising Nigeria, the sphere of intra-party 
conf licts and management would seem to have received scant attention. 
The significance of this article is therefore predicated on deepening the 
discourse in this area. Primarily, this article examines the terrain of intra-
party conf licts in a democratising Nigeria and teases out the implications 
of its pervasiveness for democratic peace and stability. It also identifies and 
engages the drivers and factors responsible for the pervasiveness of intra-
party conf lict in a democratising Nigeria. It then concludes and suggests 
options for resolution.
Conceptual framework 
Though many descriptive terms in this area of study may be viewed 
as concepts and invite analysis, two are of central significance in this 
article: ‘political party’ and ‘intra-party conf lict’. In other words, what is 
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a political party? What constitutes intra-party conf lict? However, it must 
be stressed that it is not an easy task to define them, as the two concepts 
are essentially contested (Gallie 1962:170). As regards the former, it has 
been conceptualised in various ways by scholars. To Sartori (1976:63), a 
political party is ‘any political group identified by an official label that 
presents at elections candidates for public office’. In their contribution 
to the literature, Lapalombara and Anderson (2001:143) view a political 
party as ‘any political group, in possession of an official label and a formal 
organisation that links center to locality, that presents at elections, and 
is capable of placing through elections (free or non-free) candidates for 
public offices’. Elsewhere, Ikelegbe and Osumah (2008:34) see a political 
party as a voluntary association, organised by persons bound by common 
interests, which seeks to acquire or retain power through the election of its 
candidates into public office.
What could be gleaned from the foregoing is that a political party is an 
entity made up of people whose aim is to translate the agenda that unites 
them into policy-based actions after gaining political power via the 
electoral process. Therefore, a political party is distinguished conceptually 
from other democratic institutions by the numerous functions it dispenses 
in a democracy. Agbaje (1999) has broadly categorised these into three, viz: 
electorate-related functions, government-related functions and linkage-
related functions. However, it has to be stressed that, in the case of members 
struggling for power, the dispensation of these functions is not given but 
rather depends on how well a political party has institutionalised its internal 
mechanisms for resolving conf licts. The point here is that a political party 
should have internal mechansims for managing conf licts arising among 
its members. Assessed against the background of the foregoing, therefore, 
where do we place political parties in Nigeria? We will come to this shortly, 
but before then, it is germane and imperative to first engage the concept of 
conf lict and then its subset, intra-party conf lict.
Suffice it to aver that the concept of conf lict, in spite of its ubiquitous 
use in the fields of Peace Studies, cannot be pinned down to one specific 
definition. Indeed, as Ezirim (2010:38) remarks, it has many definitions 
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which all point to the same thing. To this end, it has been defined by 
theorists from different standpoints. Thus, for Coser (1956:8), ‘conf lict is 
a struggle over values and claims to scarce status, power, and resources 
in which the aims of the opponents are to neutralise, injure, or eliminate 
their rivals’. Elsewhere, Tjosvold and Van de Vliert (1994:304) perceive 
it as the interaction of interdependent people who perceive incompatible 
goals and interference from each other in achieving their goals. For Francis 
(2006:20), it is the pursuit of incompatible interests and goals by different 
groups. In his own contribution, Wallensteen (2002:15) says that conf lict 
requires a disputed incompatibility, that is, two parties striving to acquire 
at the same time an available set of scarce resources, which can be either 
material or immaterial.
While the foregoing conceptual exposé on conf lict would seem to have 
captured the various opinions of scholars on the subject, the additional 
perspective of Hussein and others (1999) is pertinent in this article. 
Specifically, they are of the view that the concept of conf lict could be 
deployed as an all-encompassing term to cover a wide range of interactions 
which may include tension between resource users, disagreement between 
interest groups, and large-scale violence between groups. Against the 
background of the foregoing, therefore, intra-party conf lict would suggest 
a clash of interests among members of a political party who are struggling 
over the control of the decision-making machinery of the party and other 
resources that could confer certain benefits on themselves. In the words 
of Momodu and Matudi (2013:3), ‘it arises when members of the same 
political party pursue incompatible political goals or try to inf luence the 
decision making process of the party to their advantage’. In a similar vein, 
Muhammad (2008) describes it as conf lict between members of a party 
whereby some members employ certain strategies to hijack the party 
machineries with the ultimate aim of serving their personal interests.
Specifically, conf licts among members often arise over issues of internal 
leadership recruitments, the selection of candidates for general elections, 
the sharing of appointive posts (in the case of the ruling party), among 
others. To be sure, conf lict of interests among members of a political 
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party, if not well managed within the context of the legal and institutional 
framework of the party, could escalate into intense competition (for 
instance, disputants taking uncompromising positions) and eventually, 
into violence (such as assassination and arson).  
The terrain of intra-party conflicts in Nigeria’s Fourth 
Republic 
Perhaps, given the tortuous journey towards democracy and the Fourth 
Republic in 1999, it would have been expected that political parties had 
learnt from the errors of the past. Unfortunately, as the case illustration 
below demonstrates, the terrain of intra-party conf lict management did not 
improve. In the words of Muhammed (2008:11), ‘the intra party conf lict has 
remained a predominant feature of partisan politics in the Nigeria’s Fourth 
Republic. Virtually all major political parties in this republic are aff licted 
with the virus of internal crisis’. Echoing the position of Muhammed in the 
year preceding the 2015 general elections, Olorungbemi (2014:248) avers 
that, ‘since the inception of the present democratic rule in 1999, political 
party organizations were transformed into a battle field characterized 
by hatred, enmity, victimization and suspicion resulting from bitter 
struggles among party members in their quest to achieve public and/or 
personal interests’.
As a matter of fact, no party, in recent times in Nigeria, illustrates the crisis 
dimension that intra-party conf licts and their poor management have 
assumed better than the ruling All Progressives Congress (APC). It was 
formed on 6 February 2013 following the merger of the All Nigeria Peoples’ 
Party (ANPP), the Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN), the Congress for 
Progressives Change (CPC) and a faction of the All Progressives Grand 
Alliance (APGA) (Mazen 2013:1). Prior to this era, the People’s Democratic 
Party (PDP) had dominated the country’s political scene – winning 
presidential elections, controlling both the Senate and the House of 
Representatives, as well as state governments, including various states’ 
Houses of Assembly and Local Government Councils (Basiru 2015:84). 
The coming of the APC was therefore generally believed to herald a strong 
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opposition party that would give the ruling PDP strong competition (see 
Murtala 2013:1). 
Indeed, true to this general belief, the APC reversed the dominance of 
the PDP in subsequent general elections. Specifically, it won the 2015 
presidential election by almost 2.6 million votes.  In addition, it won the 
majority of seats in the Senate and the House of Representatives (BBC 2015; 
Punch 2015a; Punch 2015b). It was not long, however, before it got entangled 
in a web of internal crises and fissures arising over the sharing of executive 
positions. For instance, barely a year after its formal recognition by the 
electoral body, three of its founding leaders, Mallam Ibrahim Shekarau, 
Chief Tom Ikimi and Chief Annie Okonkwo, left the party, arguing that 
they felt almost marginalised (Daily Post 2014:1; Premium Times 2014:1).
Specifically, Tomi Ikimi, who had played a major role during merger talks 
between competing factions, resigned from the party on 26 August 2014, 
after he had confronted the National leader of the party, Asiwaju Bola 
Tinubu, and his group for imposing what he called ‘strange leadership’ on 
the party (Owete 2014:1). To be sure, his resignation was a fall out of the 
leadership crisis that trailed the National Convention of the party held in 
Abuja on 13 June 2014. To put the record straight, Chief Ikimi, having lost 
out in the power game to assume the chairmanship of the party, perhaps 
felt that he was schemed out by Tinubu and his group. In a lengthy letter 
addressed to the Chairman of the party, Chief Odigie Oyegun, dated 
27 August 2014, he openly accused Tinubu of hijacking the party for his 
personal aggrandizement. An excerpt from the letter reads: 
This reckless and arrogant self-aggrandizement paved the way for the 
imposition of a strange leadership on the APC in July 2013 when the 
party obtained registration from INEC [Independent National Electoral 
Commission]. Those of us who had worked so hard towards the successful 
merger and creation of the APC were manipulated out of the scheme of 
things. In the bizarre struggle to seize control of the party we were even 
openly accused by the self-proclaimed owners of the party, of wanting to 
steal ‘their’ party (quoted in Owete 2014:6).
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Indeed, not only did these founding leaders leave the party, but their numerous 
supporters followed suit and left the ruling PDP weakened. Castigating the 
APC, after joining the PDP, Alhaji Modu Sherrif, another founding leader who 
played a major role during the merger exercise, was reported to have stated, 
‘I have taken time to study the package called APC and come to realise that it 
won’t work. And any serious politician who knows his onions would not want 
to be in a ship that is bound to crash’ (quoted in Adebajo 2018:4). Although the 
party would seem to have succeeded in managing the next threat to its existence – 
the organisation of the 2014 presidential primary – and even although it 
assumed the dominance of the country’s political terrain in the aftermath of 
the 2015 general elections, intra-party crises have remained pervasive. These 
could be discerned in the acrimonious party primaries and congresses across 
the states in the run-up to the 2019 general elections. 
Between 29 May 2015, when many politicians who won elections in March 
and April of the same year were sworn in, and 30 June 2018, the party 
conducted gubernatorial primaries in Kogi, Bayelsa, Anambra, Edo and 
Ondo states. Except in Anambra and Bayelsa states in which the exercises to 
a reasonable extent were well managed by the national and state leadership of 
the party, others were so acrimonious that it created schisms at the national 
level. The 2016 Ondo State gubernatorial primary offers an illustration here. 
To be sure, the primary, besides generating a ‘war-like’ atmosphere among the 
contestants, pitched the party’s chairman, Chief Odigie Oyegun, against the 
national leader of the party, Bola Tinubu. The latter accused the former of 
manipulating the party’s guidelines to favour one of the candidates in order to 
emerge as the party’s flag-bearer in the November 2016 poll (Azikem 2016:1). In a 
lengthy communiqué, issued through his media office, Tinubu was reported 
to have accused Oyegun of sabotaging the will of democracy in Ondo state. 
In his words: 
[A]s a party chairman, Oyegun was supposed to protect our internal 
processes and be an impartial arbiter, a person in whom all had confidence. 
Instead, he donned the garment of a confident man, duping the NWC 
[National Working Committee], the party, and INEC in one fell blow. 
He has robbed APC members in Ondo State of the chance to pick in a fair 
manner who they believe is the best candidate (quoted in Azikem 2016:6).
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In reaction to the allegation levelled against him by Tinubu and the calls 
for his resignation, the party chairman described the allegations as ‘reckless 
falsehood’. One of the paragraphs of his rebuttal reads: 
This reckless and baseless corruption allegation leveled against me is 
unfortunate and an insult to my person and my hard-earned reputation 
which I have strongly maintained. Nobody has the kind of money that can 
buy my conscience or makes me do injury to an innocent man. In all the 
primaries conducted under my watch as National Chairman, I have strived 
to ensure a free, fair, transparent and credible process. The 2016 Ondo 
State APC Governorship Primary Election was not an exception (Premium 
Times 2016:1).
In the aftermath of the Ondo State Governorship Primary imbroglio, neither 
did Oyegun resign as demanded by Tinubu nor did the party go into extinction 
in Ondo State, but the reverberation of the impasse would seem to have set the 
stage for future confrontations between the two party leaders. Indeed, barely 
eighteen months after the Ondo State affair, the personality clash between the 
two figures came into the open again when Tinubu publicly accused Oyegun 
of frustrating his efforts at reconciling aggrieved party members across the 
states (Oladesu 2018:1). In a letter dated 21 February 2018, entitled ‘Actions 
and conduct weakening the party from within’ and sent to the President, Vice-
President, Senate President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, 
Tinubu alleges: 
Drawing from your behaviour in Kogi, Kaduna and with regard to the state 
chapter assessment requested, I am led to the inference that you have no 
intention of actually supporting my assignment. Instead, you apparently 
seek to undermine my mandate by engaging in dilatory tactics for the most 
part. When forced to act, you do so in an arbitrary and capricious manner, 
without the counsel of other NWC members and without regard to our 
internal procedures. You may have personal qualms with me. That is your 
right as a human being. However, you have no such right as the chairman 
of this party. This party belongs to all of its members. You have no greater 
claim on it than any of the rest of us (The Nation 2018:6).
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In his response, Oyegun claimed that he gave full support to Tinubu in 
the discharge of his duties in resolving the APC crisis (Nwafor 2018:1). 
Interestingly, the open rifts between the two dramatis personae may also 
have played out during the tenure elongation imbroglio. In line with Article 
17(1) and 13.2(B) of the party’s constitution and Section 223 of the 1999 
Constitution, which limit tenure of elected officers to 4 years, renewable 
once by election, the tenure of the Oyegun-led National Executive 
Council (NEC) was to run out on 30 June 2018. However, there arose, in 
some quarters within the party, a call for tenure extension of the body. 
The implication of this call is that there would not be a need for a National 
Convention of the party because the tenure of the current NEC has been 
extended (see Olagoke 2018). 
To be sure, the pro-tenure elongation group justified their contention 
on the ground that holding a National Convention and congresses a few 
months before the party primaries across all levels would create chaos, 
and might affect the electoral fortune of the party in the 2019 general 
elections. Conversely, the other group insisted that the provisions of the 
party’s constitution, which stipulate periodic elections, must be adhered to 
so as not to incur the wrath of the electoral body. In the end, however, the 
position of the latter prevailed, as the party gave it official backing at the 
caucus meeting held in May 2018. Soonest, true to the fear and predictions 
of the pro-extension group, except the National Convention of the party 
held without rancour in Abuja on 23 June 2018, congresses conducted at 
all levels to elect the party executives, were marred by crisis. In Lagos, for 
instance, a jurisdiction that many may have expected to be crisis free, due 
to perceived hegemonic hold of the National leader on the state, there were 
two parallel congresses (This Day 2016:8). 
Indeed, if the map of the country was shaded with a colour to indicate all 
places where congresses generated into an open rift, there would hardly be 
an unshaded portion on the map. Interestingly, the rancorous congresses 
across the country, as predicted, snowballed into the party’s primaries to 
elect the candidates for the 2015 general elections. Although the National 
Convention of the party produced the incumbent president, Muhammadu 
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Buhari in a rancour-free atmosphere, the same remark might not be made 
about other primaries to elect State Governors, members of the National 
Assembly and members of the State Houses of Assembly (Neme 2018:3; 
Ebiri 2018:8; Akeregha 2018:3). Centring mainly on the mode of electing 
candidates, the party was further factionalised. In the majority of States, 
barring the few in which the earlier party congresses were well managed, 
there were tussles between the State Governors and those opposed to what 
they regarded as State Governors’ imposition. Very soon, the National 
Chairman, Comrade Adam Oshiomhole, was caught up in the crises which 
rocked three States (Abuh 2018:12). 
As a matter of fact, the latent conf lict came into the open when three 
Governors, Abdel Aziz Yari, Rochas Okorocha and Ibikunle Amosun 
of Zamfara, Imo and Ogun States, respectively, accused the National 
Chairman of being behind the crises in their States. The Governors of 
Imo and Ogun States were clinically scathing in their attacks of the party 
chairman. The former of the two claimed that the fortunes of the party, not 
only in Imo State but also in the South-east, had suffered a reversal under 
the chairman. His counterpart from Ogun State criticised the chairman 
for visiting injustice on Ogun by not allowing the wishes of the people 
to stand (Fabiyi et al. 2018:8). Responding to these criticisms within 
twenty-four hours, the chairman informed the public that the renewed 
attacks on him were a result of the failure of the governors concerned to 
foist an undemocratic process on the party (Ebegbulam 2018:1). As regards 
Governor Okorocha, he stated: ‘... what I am not able to do for Governor 
Okorocha is to assist him with the instrument of APC to help him to build 
a political dynasty’ (Alechenu and Akinkuotu 2018:8). What could be 
gleaned from the foregoing narratives is that the ruling APC, like the PDP, 
had also been caught in the web of pervasive intra-party conf licts. 
Implications of pervasive intra-party conflicts 
Pervasive intra-party conf licts as painted in the foregoing paragraphs could 
have wide-ranging implications for the peace and stability of a society, 
especially one that is still trying to consolidate democratic governance. 
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In the first place, they are not only a threat to the party concerned, but 
also a major source of political instability. Functionally, as remarked 
earlier, political parties, performing their traditional responsibilities of 
internal conf lict management could be purveyors of political stability 
in the society. However, political parties that are unable to marshal 
disagreements within the frameworks of extant rules are not likely to be 
able to perform functions that could enhance the stability of the polity 
(Omotola 2010:130). Seen this way, therefore, intra-party squabbles and 
‘wars’, as are characteristic of the post-1999 Nigerian politics (Omoruyi 
2002:8), have not only institutionalised indiscipline and political vagrancy 
(Basiru 2015: 92), but have, as the narrative of the APC’s crisis has shown, 
created an environment for political instability both within and outside 
the parties. In their insightful study on the internal working of the PDP 
prior to the 2003 general elections, Amadasu and Amadasu (2003:120) 
implicate the party as an organisation riddled with internal schisms, 
brigandage and subterfuge. These pathologies, according to them, do 
not only weaken the party, but also do not allow for cooperative effort or 
support needed by the party to develop the economy. However, to draw a 
conclusion that pervasive intra-party conf licts and their antimonies are 
trademarks of only the ruling parties would perhaps amount to taking a 
jaundiced position. Indeed, the intra-party conf licts that rocked the Allied 
Congress Party of Nigeria (ACPN), in the run-up to the recently concluded 
presidential election, offer an illustration here. The conf lict centred on the 
rift between the party’s presidential candidate, Dr Obiageli Ezekwesili and 
key officials of the party led by the chairman of the party, Alhaji Ganiyu 
Galadima. The chairman and other key officials of the party did not only 
direct their numerous members, following Dr Ezekwesili’s withdrawal 
from the presidential race, to support the APC’s presidential candidate, 
but also accused Dr Ezekwesili of using the party’s platform to negotiate 
herself into the position of the country’s finance minister. She was further 
accused of not consulting with the party before withdrawing from the 
presidential race on 24 January 2019 (Ugbede 2019a). In her reaction to 
the party’s allegation, Dr Ezekwesili accused the party and its leadership 
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of engaging in transactional politics which she detested (Ugbede 2019b). 
What is inferable from the foregoing illustration is that minor parties may 
also be caught in the web of pervasive intra-party squabbles. 
Beyond being an albatross to societal peace and democratic stability, 
intractable intra-party conf licts, if not nipped in the bud, could also play 
out at the horizontal level of intra-governmental relations. Specifically, 
such conf licts could create unhealthy executive-legislative relations, 
especially in the spheres of public budgets and appointment ratifications 
(Aiyede and Isumonah 2002; Aiyede 2005). Theoretically, the executive 
and the legislative arms of government are meant to be autonomous of each 
other, but the realities and complexities of modern societies have made 
their co-operation imperative (Basiru 2014:80). Although conf licts and 
gridlocks between the two organs are sometimes inevitable, this could be 
better managed where there is a culture of party discipline and cohesion. 
Where such is lacking and intra-party conf licts have become so pervasive, 
executive-legislative gridlocks, when they do occur, are often akin to 
brinkmanship, if not warfare. As a matter of fact, since the return of 
Nigeria to democracy in 1999, there have been many documented instances 
in which legislators and Governors in the same parties, did not only 
frustrate governance but also attempted to destabilise the social system. 
The 2004/2005 intra-party crisis in Oyo State’s PDP offers an illustration 
here. While it lasted, it did not only polarise the party into Alhaji Adedibu 
and Governor Ladoja camps, but also the State’s legislature. The zenith of 
the crisis was when the Governor was illegally impeached by the legislators 
loyal to Alhaji Lamidi Adedibu on 3 January 2005 (see Ladoja 2018:12). 
At another level, the intra-party conf licts had, in many instances, led to 
the criminalisation of political struggles in which politicians engaged in an 
assassination spree (Basiru 2015:92). As reported, between 2001 and 2006, 
many political heavyweights, from all sides of the political spectrum, were 
felled down by assassins. These include among others Chief Bola Ige, Chief 
Harry Marshall, Ahmed Pategi, Funso Williams (Olorungbemi 2014:263). 
Finally, in the course of contestation for power within a party, players may 
embark on primordial mobilisation which could create further divisions 
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in the society which in the long run will threaten national stability. 
The 2002 impeachment crisis in the national government in Nigeria 
illustrates this clearly. At the height of the intra-party crisis in the PDP in 
which the President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives were 
involved, both personalities resorted to ethnic mobilisation in order to 
outwit each other (see Omotola 2006). By such actions, the ethnic groups 
of the two personalities, within and outside the House of Representatives, 
also got involved in the crisis (Fashagba 2010:136–137). 
Predisposing factors and drivers 
The previous sections of this paper have teased out the implications of 
intra-party conf licts for society peace and democratic stability. Since such 
conf licts are pervasive and have permeated the country’s body politik, the 
poser is raised: how are pervasive intra-party conf licts to be explained? 
To be sure, this calls for the deciphering of the predisposing factors and 
drivers of intra-party conf licts. 
The first thesis that is proposed here is that a weak party system, the 
incubator of pervasive intra-party conf licts in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic, 
cannot be divorced from the character and content of the democratisation 
project that was first imposed on Nigeria and other African counries by the 
colonial authorities during the decolonisation era. The project was further 
marketed and promoted by the Bretton Woods institutions, as part of the 
‘political conditionality’ packages, during the structural adjustment era 
(Adetula 2011:10). As argued elsewhere, this factor can be better understood 
and appreciated if situated within the context of the country’s colonial 
history (Basiru 2015:93). The argument being teased out here is that liberal 
democracy and all its appurtenances, inclusive of political parties, emerged 
in Nigeria within a colonial framework. As Basiru (2018:137) remarks, 
‘liberal democracy and its institutional components, like other Eurocentric 
social institutions that have become an integral part of Nigeria’s socio-
economic and political existence, were products of British colonial 
engineering’. To be sure, with colonial order in place, many functioning 
traditional democracies in Nigeria and elsewhere in Africa were supplanted 
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by the European-modelled bureaucratic state. What thus emerged, was a 
model of democracy whose underlying ideologies and values were alien to 
the players (Parekh 1993). Indeed, when liberal competitive democracy, 
adapted to the European cultural milieu, superseded pre-colonial traditions 
in Africa, it took another form. Resultantly, what blossomed in Nigeria and 
other colonies in Africa, was a democracy that was in content and form 
markedly different from the one in Europe (Mafeje 2002). Interestingly, by 
the time party democracy eventually emerged in colonial Nigeria, during 
the decolonisation phase of its evolution, what emerged were parties 
that were the complete opposite of parties in Europe – lacking internal 
discipline and a democractic ethos. The point here is that institutions of 
liberal democracy, including party politics, exported to Africa/Nigeria 
did not fit into the African cultural milieu. Putting this in perspective, 
Finkel and others (2008:15) aver, ‘the adoption of particular institutions 
(elections, legislatures, universal suffrage, and so on) is … a necessary but 
not a sufficient condition for the establishment of democracy’. Deductively, 
therefore, the pervasive intra-party conf licts that have characterised party 
politics in the post-1999 era, as those in the previous Republics, are throw-
backs of the crises of the liberal democratisation project in Nigeria/Africa. 
Closely related to the above is the issue of praetorian hangover. Put 
differently, consider the effect of long years of military dictatorship on 
the country’s political firmament and the attendant implications on the 
nascent democratic project in the country. Prior to 1999, the military, for 
fifteen years, dominated the country’s politics and while in power, the 
military wing of the ruling elites became focused on accumulating wealth. 
By the time the institution exited from politics, some of them, labeled as 
the ‘political soldiers’, joined some of the newly formed political parties, 
especially the ruling PDP (Adekanye 2000). Upon joining these parties, 
their military instincts would seem to have become manifest, and they were 
unable to acculturise into the new democratic environment. In the words 
of Omotola (2010:66), ‘the dominance of the retired officials, without a 
corresponding reorientation of values and sufficient time lag to adjust to 
civil life, meant they came into the democratic job with a military ethos 
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and mindset’. The case of the first democratically elected president in the 
Fourth Republic, General Obasanjo, offers an illustration here. Having 
been given state pardon by the regime of General Abdulsalam Abubakar in 
1998, he joined the PDP, received its presidential ticket and later won the 
presidential election and was sworn in as president on 29 May 1999. Upon 
consolidating his hold on power, he began the process of de-democratising 
and de-institutionalising the party: altering rules, applying intimidation 
and triggering conf licts of various genres (see Basiru 2015:96; Amadasu 
and Amadasu 2003:120). 
The neo-patrimonial character of the Nigerian state and the politics that 
it engenders offers another perspective for understanding the causes of 
pervasive intra-party crises in a democratising Nigeria. The Nigerian petro- 
state, unlike the taxation-driven states, is not really a productive one but a 
rentier one that depends on oil rent (Obi 2011:62). Given its central role in 
the economy and collection of oil rents, coupled with its non-autonomy in 
relations to the social classes, the Nigerian petro-state, over the years, has 
become the arena of intra-class struggles in which the triumphant party 
becomes the dispenser of oil wealth. And given the imperial nature of the 
country’s presidential system, the individual that captures power through 
the instrumentality of the ruling party becomes the holder of the keys to the 
country’s treasury (see Basiru 2016). This reality may have accounted for 
the fierce struggles among the key gladiators in PDP – in the run-ups to the 
2003, 2007 and 2011 presidential elections – to get the party’s presidential 
ticket to preside over the department of capital accumulation (Okereka 
2015:100; Amadasu and Amadasu 2003:120). 
Conclusion and recommendations 
In liberal jurisdictions, political parties have, over the years, evolved 
efficient institutional frameworks for dealing with conf licts among their 
rank and file, to prevent them from escalating into crises. In contrast, 
Nigeria’s political parties, as it has been demonstrated in this article, have 
not really institutionalised such frameworks. Resultantly, intra-party 
conf licts, and all genres of antinomies associated with them, have become 
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ubiquitous in recent times. This article has ref lected on these, discussed 
their implications for societal peace and stability and identified their 
drivers. As has been revealed through the example of the All Progressive 
Congress (APC), pervasive intra-party conf licts are not only threats to 
democratic consolidation but also to social harmony and stability. They 
may snow-ball into intra-governmental crises and by so doing, affect 
governance and development. To conclude, the arguments above clearly 
suggest that intra-party conf licts are rooted in a genre of political practice 
which makes entrance into public office a surety for easy access to public 
resources and an avenue to private accumulation of wealth.
On this basis and also as an imperative to chart a way forward, a number 
of reform measures are suggested. At a more general level, to this end, 
concerted efforts should be made by concerned agencies in charge of 
national organisations to acculturalise and re-orientate the political actors, 
especially the gladiators, towards embracing the age-long meaning of 
politics – which is service to the community. Indeed, in some jurisdictions 
with a longer history of democratic practice, democratic politics is seen by 
politicians as calls to service. Perhaps, that partly explains why electoral 
games, within and outside political parties, in such climes are played with 
decorum and civility. Rather unfortunately among the later democratisers, 
as in the case being examined in this study, democratic politics and its 
niceties are portrayed as an investment. Such orientations have over the 
years tended to heighten the premium placed on capturing political power 
within and outside the political parties. Therefore the conditions, material 
or otherwise, that make politics and by extension intra-party struggles for 
power ‘warlike’, should be looked into. Civil society organisations, through 
a strong and robust advocacy, must ensure that efforts are geared towards 
reviewing the cost of governance in Nigeria. The aim here is to make public 
office less attractive, and by so doing, decrease the desperation of the 
members of the political class to capture power at all cost. Civil society 
organisations must engage and promote an agenda towards re-engineering 
politics and governance in Nigeria.   
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Beyond the foregoing general recommendation, political parties in Nigeria 
urgently need to re-examine and re-engineer their internal mechanisms 
for managing conf licts within them. Although there is no doubt that 
almost all political parties in the country have processes for internal 
conf lict management enshrined in their constitutions, it would appear 
from existential realities that these institutional frameworks are weak. 
They, therefore, need to be re-engineered and further strengthened. 
Further, political parties in Nigeria, especially the most powerful, must 
work towards strengthening the capacities of local branches in the sphere 
of conf lict resolution. In other words, the extant centralised approach to 
intra-party resolution of conf licts needs to be replaced by a decentralised 
approach in which local branches play pivotal roles. Again, political parties 
should attempt to incorporate non-adversarial conf lict management 
models into their internal conf lict management menu. This will help to 
inculcate a culture of trust and win-win attitudes at all levels within parties. 
Finally, the judiciary, usually the next port of call when internal party 
resolution mechanisms fail to resolve lingering conf licts, needs to be 
reformed for enhanced electoral justice delivery. To this end, reforms to 
ensure efficient and speedy dispensation of electoral justice need to be 
urgently undertaken. Attempts may, for instance, be made by concerned 
authorities in Nigeria to establish special courts, like election petition 
tribunals, with jurisdictions over intra-party conf licts. An efficient judicial 
sector that can deliver justice speedily will contribute to lessening tensions 
among disputants within parties.
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